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IC 74-0519

17 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Middle East Post-Mortem, Phase II

1. We are committed to produce a number of additional reports (or briefings) concerning the Community's performance during the crisis in the Middle East last fall. Our commitment arises from some specific promises we have made to assess given areas of Community effort and from tasks we have been assigned by the DCI, as formulated in the Recommendations (Section V.) of the Preliminary Post-Mortem Report. (Extracts from the latter may be found in Attachment A.) This memorandum addresses that commitment--what we have done so far (in addition to producing the preliminary report), are doing, and propose to do.

2. Three studies related to the post-mortem effort (Phase II) have been (or will shortly be) completed. They are: (1) the briefing of USIB by [] concerning the nature of the warning process, as exemplified by the October crisis in the Middle East; (2) the (forthcoming) briefing of USIB by [] concerning the concept of the National Family of Products proposal, as amended and focused by lessons drawn from the Mid-East post-mortem effort to date; and (3) a talking paper concerning some very specific aspects of the performance of DIA during the Mid-East crisis, this to be delivered to certain senior officers in DIA by [] and discussed with Admiral de Poix by General Graham.

3. Five additional Phase II projects are currently under way:


a. Operations of the Intelligence Community During Periods of Crisis: This study is well in hand following a series of interviews conducted throughout the Community. The problems identified in these interviews will be illustrated

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by references to operations during the Middle East crisis. The study's recommendations will concentrate on ways to improve analytical performance during times of crisis and to attune collection activities more closely to the needs of analysts. (Further remarks concerning the scope of this paper are attached as Attachment B.) Action Officer:

b. Performance of the Intelligence Community During the Arab-Israeli War: This effort will focus on the critical phase of the war, 16-26 October (i. e., from the Israeli breakthrough on the West Bank to the beginnings of the period of relative stability on the front). Using the crisis methodology developed by [] and the interagency post-mortem team, this examination will seek to assess performance, identify deficiencies and problems, and propose remedies. It may in part overlap with areas to be examined in our collection study (paragraphs 3 and 4, below). (Further comments concerning this study (which will be offered initially in briefing form) may be found in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Attachment C.) Action Officer: []



The diagram consists of a horizontal line with several rectangular blocks of varying lengths and positions. The blocks are arranged in a way that suggests a sequence or a process flow. The blocks are labeled with numbers 1 through 6.

Block Number	Approximate Start Position (0-100)	Approximate End Position (0-100)
1	5	35
2	27	98
3	3	17
4	3	43
5	29	42
6	53	67

d. Challenge Mechanisms: We are scheduled to produce a study of challenge procedures which could enhance the Community's analytical prowess and which could (through the Community's publications) help to answer some of the demands of the consumer for a better product. Some initial work--field research, if you like--has been done on this project by [redacted] through the cooperation of the NIOs.

Action Officers: [redacted]

c. Alert Mechanisms: The DCI has directed the establishment of "a common community/ alert mechanism to deal with crisis situations" (see Attachment A, B.3.). In our view, such

a mechanism can, and should, be set up in conjunction with the development of the NOIWON (National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network), a system which is soon to be tested. Our tentative notion at this point is to recommend that IC Staff prepare a paper which would define a community alert, suggest ways to initiate such an alert, and propose procedures to be followed in the event of such an alert. Action Officers: [REDACTED]

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4. Another Phase II report--concerning the Community's collection efforts during the Middle East crisis--is in the embryo stage. Lapham and [REDACTED] have discussed this project in general terms with [REDACTED] have, in addition, been in close touch concerning specific aspects of collection problems.

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5. PRG proposes that: (a) the collection study be undertaken by CPAG, with PRG support; (b) it address the feasibility and desirability of establishing community "contingency collection plans" for crisis periods and crisis-prone areas; (c) it make the case for such contingency plans largely on the basis of problems uncovered by an investigation of collection performance during the Middle East crisis (assuming, of course, that areas of weakness are in fact identified by such an investigation); (d) it make specific recommendations dealing with ways to "sell" and implement the concept of contingency collection plans, including suggestions concerning ways both to shift priorities almost automatically and immediately in the event of crisis and to identify in advance the kinds of information likely to be required by analysts during a crisis; and, finally, (e) the study recommend the establishment of the appropriate machinery and procedures for identifying possible crisis areas of particular interest to the US (many of the areas--e.g., the Middle East--are obvious, though US interests may not be), proposing actual changes in priorities for the various collection efforts, and developing the actual plans for collection activities in these areas and under these priorities.

6. It may be that as work progresses the character and objectives of some of these Phase II projects will be modified. It may also turn out that additional discrete studies will fall out of work currently in progress. (One possibility is a revival and updating of [REDACTED] study of the NIC/Watch Committee/National Warning Center concept.) Finally, it should be recalled that most of our recommendations should stand on their own, i. e., should proceed

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from judgments based on broad criteria and desiderata and thus not rest solely on conclusions drawn from assessments of the Community's performance during the Middle East crisis. This dictum--which I think will cause us only a presentational problem--originated with the DCI. (See Attachment D.)




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① - PRG subject

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